The classification of ageing as a disease is fundamental to developing new pharmacological strategies that can target said phenomenon. The European Medicines Agency does not do this and maintains a questionable perspective based on the traditional naturalistic argument and the value-free ideal. An alternative is proposed which, inspired by consequentialism, is committed to considering ageing as a disease in European regulatory contexts as long as the ethical consequences are desirable. Within a realistic framework, I show that making this decision would (...) have moderate positive effects such as increased knowledge about antiageing pharmacology or potential greater chances of completing vital projects. Furthermore, we will see that the main arguments used by critics to show that the negative effects outweigh the positive ones are not sound. Therefore, I conclude that it would be beneficial for the European Medicines Agency to change its position on ageing. (shrink)

This paper presents a program of action for the philosophy of regulatory science, based on a general theory of social epistemology. Two candidates are considered. The first one, offered by Alvin Goldman, is not fit for our purposes because it is focused on a veritism incompatible with non‐epistemic aims of regulatory science. The second, championed by Steve Fuller, sociologically investigates the existing means of producing knowledge, to modify them with the goal of obtaining democratic aims through action on a legislative (...) meta‐level. The program has been built upon this procedure, instantiated by the identification, characterization, and modification of epistemic policies. (shrink)

In this article I present the two essential conceptions of conspiracy theories, offering reasons for working from the point of view of the second one. Next, I introduce the debate between internalism and externalism of justification and, following the most contemporary perspectives, I focus on the political and social applicability of the second one, for which I use the srinivasian concept of “bad ideology case”. This new perspective allows me to interpret the conspiracy theories in function of this debate and (...) show their lack of epistemic justification. Finally, I analyse the epistemic trust phenomenon, an opposed model to conspiracy theories, answering affirmatively to the two essential questions of its epistemic justification and its criticality. (shrink)